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Abstract: Politics must address multiple problems simultaneously. In an ideal
world, political competition would force parties to adopt priorities that reflect the
voters’ true concerns. In reality, parties can run their campaigns in such a way as
to manipulate voters’ priorities. This phenomenon, known as priming, may allow
parties to underinvest in solving the issues that they intend to mute.
We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking
parties (i) invest in policy quality to increase the value of their platform and (ii)
choose a communication strategy to prime voters. We identify novel feedbacks
between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming
effects can constrain parties to invest more resources in all issues. We also identify
the conditions under which parties prefer to focus on their “historical issues” or to
engage in “issue stealing”.
Keywords: party strategy, salience, issue selection and ownership, priming.
JEL codes: D72, H11
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‘The critical difference among elections is the problem concern of the
voters, not their policy attitudes’ A. Petrocik
A central part of a candidate’s electoral campaign is to identify key policy issues
and advertise how he or she intends to address them if elected. To decide which
candidate to vote for, the core of the electorate then evaluates each candidate’s pro-
posals, and whether each candidate’s main issues accord with their own priorities.
As long as the candidates’ choice of issues conforms with the voters’ sense of pri-
orities, political competition can only benefit voters. However, as voters’ priorities
are malleable (Smith 1985a, 1985b; Page and Shapiro, 1992), political campaigns
can also be expected to aim at manipulating the voters’ sense of priorities to the
candidate’s own advantage. This makes the political process of issue selection in
political campaigns far from trivial,4 and raises three interlinked questions: (i) How
many core campaign issues will candidates select? (ii) What will these issues be?
Those important to the voters, or those important to the candidate? (iii) Does
the candidates’ capacity to manipulate voters’ priorities eventually hurt or benefit
voters?
Among the research on parties’ incentives to select specific issues for their cam-
paigns, the influential work by Riker (1993) identifies the dominance and dispersion
principles. The dominance principle states that when one party dominates on a
particular issue, it brings it to the fore of its campaign, whereas the other party
abandons it. The dispersion principle states that when neither party dominates,
both parties abandon the issue. The behavioral prescription of these principles is
that each party should emphasize not only its own strengths but also its opponent’s
4Among others, Iyengar et al. (1982, p848) emphasizes that the ability of self-interested players
to prime citizens evokes the “sinister possibility” that political elites “might determine what the
public takes to be important”.
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Achilles’ heel. Yet, Riker does not identify what allows a party to “dominate” on
an issue.
Petrocik’s (1996) issue ownership theory fills this gap, associating party domi-
nance with its “reputation for greater competence in handling the issue”. A party’s
reputation for greater competence might stem from better technical expertise to
handle the issue or from an ideological bias that makes the party more committed
to addressing it. Accordingly, the Democrats should be expected to systematically
emphasize issues such as “education” and “healthcare”, whereas the Republicans
should focus on foreign and security issues, such as “terrorism” or “immigration”.
While such predictions have been met in several elections, the history of electoral
campaigns also abounds with counterexamples. In the US, in the presidential cam-
paign of 2000, Bush turned education and social security into key issues for his
campaign, despite them being traditionally Democratic.5 Conversely, Clinton man-
aged to turn the issue “criminality” –historically owned by the Republicans– into
a major asset for his 1996 presidential campaign.6 Moreover, both candidates may
mute some issues during a campaign, even though they are important for the voters.
Both McCain and Obama muted the issue “illegal immigration” in their presidential
campaigns, despite the fact that it was perceived as “important” or “very important”
by 60% of voters in January 2008 (Fortune magazine poll, see pollingreport.com),
both Clinton and Bush abandoned the issue “drugs” during their 1992 campaigns
5Damore (2004) writes that “the 2000 campaign is an outlier that does not comport with my
theoretical expectation”; Petrocik et al. (2004) hold that “the 2000 election was an outlier” and,
in a similar fashion, Aldrich et al. (2005) state that “the tradition of the issue ownership approach
therefore had nothing to say about many of the voters’ major concerns in the 2000 election.”
These facts, reinforced by empirical work on issue ownership (see e.g. Ansolabehere and Iyengar
1994; Sides 2006; Sigelman and Buell 2004; Pope and Wonn 2008; Walgrave et al. 2009) highlight
a non negligible degree of instability in the association between party reputation and the choice of
issues in electoral campaigns.
6Holian (2004, p97) details “how the Clinton campaign and, in turn, the administration turned
a long-time Democratic weakness into a non-issue in 1992, and ultimately a rhetorical strength by
the 1996 campaign”. See also Damore (2004).
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even though it was the issue most cited by voters in August 1991 (Washington Post
opinion poll, see ropercenter.uconn.edu).7
We propose a theory that identifies when and why parties, in accordance with
Petrocik’s issue ownership theory, choose either to focus on campaign issues for which
they have a better reputation, or to engage in issue stealing (aka issue trespassing).
We follow Petrocik in letting reputation reflect past actions and past rhetorical
arguments, but, importantly, we distinguish between reputation and actual policy
proposals. In our setup, reputation determines issue ownership before the campaign
starts, but, expanding beyond Petrocik’s idea of reputation, we also consider the
ability for each party to improve its program. When preparing their programs,
parties can invest supplementary resources to develop novel policies and acquire
newly built “rhetorical dominance”. This ability to invest, we find, may induce
parties to end up raising an issue on which they initially were not perceived to be
dominant. Our theory thus incorporates the idea that, even if costly, parties can
engineer a policy proposal that offsets their initially weak reputation.
Central to our analysis is the parties’ ability to prime voters. Priming reflects
the capacity of the parties and the press to influence (or even manipulate) the voters’
sense of priorities across issues.8 A well-understood effect of priming via a political
campaign is what we call the attention-shifting effect : by focusing its campaign on
a particular issue, a candidate can induce voters to partially ignore the other issues
7The issue “drugs” being abandoned, it lost importance in opinion polls throughout the 1992
campaign. This pattern prevails in most campaigns: muted issues lose salience, whereas the
opposite happens for the main campaign themes – we return to these “priming effects” below.
8There is ample evidence that voter priorities can be influenced by party advertisement. The
claim that the media may not be successful in telling people what to think, but they are successful
in telling them what to think about (Cohen, 1963), first corroborated by McCombs and Shaw
(1972), got strong support in a vast experimental and empirical literature in psychology, political
psychology and political science (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1981, 1984; Iyengar 1990; Iyengar
et al. 1982; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Kinder 1990, Sheafer and Weimann 2005,
Bartels 2006. For a critique, see also Lenz 2009).
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at the time of voting. We find that such voter malleability induces each party to
focus its campaign on one issue only, the one on which it has acquired the strongest
dominance. This has three important implications: (1) the core issue chosen by the
party need not be the one that voters find the most important. (2) The electoral
campaign will address fewer issues than those the electorate actually cares about.
In particular, both parties abandon/mute the issues for which the quality gap is the
smallest. (3) Whether or not there is issue stealing depends on the parties’ relative
incentive to invest in each issue.
A party’s relative incentive depends on a second and novel effect of priming,
which we call the homogenization effect : the better parties become at manipulating
voters’ priorities, the more homogeneous the electorate becomes. In our model, all
voters listen to all campaign advertisements. Through priming, the ads affect voters’
priorities in such a way that voters come to perceive as more important those issues
discussed by the candidates than those not mentioned during the campaign. Thus,
as the electoral campaign progresses, the priorities of the voters not only come to
reflect more closely those of the parties, but they also become more similar among
voters. This homogenization effect implies that the competition for votes will be
tougher at the end of the electoral campaign, because any marginal change in a
party’s platform quality can produce a large increase in the party’s probability of
winning. Our results show that, when parties become very good at manipulating
voters, they may end up in an ’issue race’, in which they must invest massively in
all issues. In this case, issue stealing may obtain in equilibrium, which renders issue
ownership unstable.
Whether or not there is issue stealing also depends on the strength of the parties’
initial reputation. The fact that a party initially owns an issue is not sufficient to
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conclude that the party should campaign on it. What matters is the magnitude of the
reputational gap on the issue between the two parties (together with their capacity
to prime voters). When the gap is small, the weaker party has a clear incentive to
compensate for its initial handicap with higher investments, which might result in
issue stealing. Interestingly, this incentive can be reinforced by the inability of the
parties to manipulate voters’ priorities, and by the voters’ valuation of the parties’
investment in the issues on which none of the parties dominates.
Finally, we find that parties may end up suffering the costs of their capacity
to manipulate voters’ priorities, while voters may benefit from being manipulable.
Indeed, as explained above, as parties become more skilled at priming voters, inter-
party competition increases. Parties are forced to invest more in crafting better
proposals on some issues, which benefits voters. Yet, parties also underinvest in the
issues they intend to abandon. The overall welfare implications of these investment
shifts depend on the voters’ true valuation of the parties’ efforts on each issue.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: first, we introduce the model. Then,
each section focuses on a different stage of the game, which we solve backwards: we
begin by solving for the voting stage, then the communication stage, and finally the
policy quality stage. We conclude by suggesting directions for future research. Most
proofs are in the appendix.
The Model
Two office-motivated parties, denoted by P ∈ {A,B} , compete for votes in an elec-
tion. For the sake of tractability, the policy space is restricted to three dimensions:
each voter is concerned by up to three issues k ∈ {a, b, c}. The electoral game has
three stages: (1) each party drafts a platform with proposals for each issue. A
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proposal is identified by its quality, qPk ≥ 0. The platform of party P is a vector
of qualities: qP ≡ {qPa , qPb , qPc }. (2) Given the two parties’ platforms, each party
decides how much communication time tPk ≥ 0 to allocate to each issue.9 (3) On
election day, each voter casts her ballot for the party who proposes the highest
weighted average quality.10 As detailed below, the weights used to compute average
quality are given by each voter’s salience weights sik ∈ [0, 1].11
Our setup contrasts with the classical Downsian approach to political competi-
tion. In a Downsian context, party choices would be driven by the party’s preferences
over issues and by the divisiveness of each issue.12 We voluntarily abstract from these
ideological cleavages to focus on policy innovations. Put differently, we focus on the
common value (vertical differentiation) rather than on the ideological divisiveness
(horizontal differentiation) dimension of policies (the conclusion discusses how the
model could be extended to incorporate ideology). Finally, our setup assumes sym-
metric information and full commitment: all policy qualities are observable at the
election stage and, once elected, a party actually implements the policies developed
at stage 1. In this way, we reduce the gap between pre- and post-electoral consider-
ations.13
9The timing between stages 1 and 2 can be reversed or actions made simultaneous without af-
fecting any of the pure strategy equilibrium results. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, parties would
always re-optimize their communication campaign in light of their realized relative performance
on each issue, which makes our timing more meaningful.
10In a closely related paper, Krasa and Polborn (2010) only consider the investment stage, and
abstract from the advertisement stage. They show that equilibrium platform policies diverge,
but not enough from a welfare perspective. Conversely, Amoro´s and Puy (2013) only consider the
advertisement stage. They show when parties advertise the same or different issues.
11This parametrization builds on Belanger and Meguid’s (2008) empirical finding that a voter’s
decision is more impacted by party ownership in issue k, the more importance she gives to the
issue in question (p479).
12Glazer and Lohmann (1989), and Morelli and Van Weelden (2011 and 2013) consider a frame-
work in which the incumbent can work on ideological issues respectively to close the issue or to
signal her type. Krasa and Polborn (2014) study the interaction between the degree of polarization
on divisive issues and party proposals on the tax rate. Finally, Aragone`s and Sa´nchez-Page´s (2010)
highlight how an incumbent reacts to the emergence of an exogenously important issue.
13Demange and Van Der Straeten (2013) propose a model in which voters are imperfectly in-
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Stage 1: proposal quality. Both parties simultaneously invest resources to
produce policy innovations that increase their proposals’ quality on each issue,
qPk (≥ 0).14 The investment cost of delivering a proposal of quality qPk (≥ 0) is quadratic
in quality and decreasing in the party’s reputation on the issue, θPk :
CPk
(
qPk
)
=
(
qPk
)2
θPk
.
Summing across issues, the total cost of drafting the party manifesto is: CP
(
qP
)
=∑
k
[
(qPk )
2/θPk
]
.
Party reputation θPk reflects among other things the expertise of the party staff
and Congressmen accumulated in the past, as in Petrocik (1996). In our model,
this expertise increases the party’s ability to develop novel proposals that voters
will value. However, what matters for the upcoming campaign is not only the past.
At the time of the election, voters will compare the quality qPk of the parties’ actual
proposals (see below). Quality is thus the key variable to determine issue ownership
at the end of the campaign. Delivering high quality is costly, but this cost is lower
for the party with a better expertise on the issue.
We assume that θAa > θ
B
a and θ
A
b < θ
B
b : party A enjoys a reputation advantage
a` la Petrocik on issue a and party B on issue b. We also assume that θAc = θ
B
c :
both parties are equally good at tackling issue c.15 Throughout, we focus on the
symmetric case, in which θ ≡ θAa = θBb > 1, θAb = θBa = 1 and θAc = θBc = θc ≥ 0.
formed, and parties have control on how much information they provide about each issue.
14Other models distinguish the incumbent from the challenger, in which case moves are sequen-
tial. See for instance Glazer and Lohmann (1999), Soubeyran and Gautier (2008), Morelli and Van
Weelden (2011) or Egorov (2012).
15Belanger and Meguid (2008, pp482 and 487) find that only 15% of the voters consider that
a same party dominates on all issues. Such voters should be considered as pure partisans, whose
voting behavior is not influenced by the mechanisms we identify. Instead, the voting decisions of
the remaining 85% are found to strongly depend on the relationship between party reputation and
issue salience.
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Notice that we do not make any assumption on the value of θc, which can be zero
(in which case this issue disappears from the election), larger or smaller than 1, and
larger or smaller than θ.
We refer to issue specialization as the case in which the parties’ quality provisions
mirror their reputation advantages. Issue stealing is the complementary situation:
Definition 1 There is “issue specialization” if qAa ≥ qBa and qAb ≤ qBb with proba-
bility one, given the equilibrium strategy played by the parties. Conversely, there is
“issue stealing” if at least one of these inequalities is violated with strictly positive
probability.
Stage 2: the communication campaign. Parties allocate their communication
time to induce voters to focus more on the issue(s) of their choosing. Let tPk (≥ 0)
denote the amount of time (or the value of the advertisements) that party P de-
votes to campaigning on issue k. Throughout the campaign, the total amount of
campaigning time devoted to issue k is:
tk = t
A
k + t
B
k .
Normalizing total campaigning time to 1 and assuming that each party controls half
of the total campaigning time, each party’s time constraint is:16
tA ≡
∑
k
tAk =
1
2
=
∑
k
tBk ≡ tB.
16As we show in the supplementary appendix, the model directly extends to endogenous cam-
paigning budgets and advertisement times. When facing identical fundraising opportunities, the
outcome is always that the two parties choose the same allocation of spending between quality and
advertisement, which implies that tA = tB in equilibrium. Slass (2001, p4) for instance illustrates
that the Republicans spent $83.5 million on issue ads, and the Democrats $78.4 million in the
1999-2000 campaign.
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The role of the communication campaign is to influence the voters’ salience
weights. The more parties communicate on issue k, the more this issue will weigh
on the voters’ decision at stage 3. The process through which communication affects
the salience of an issue has been termed priming by political psychologists. In the
context of an electoral campaign, priming effects imply that voters attach larger
salience to the issues that are emphasized more.17 Our contribution in this respect
is to offer a tractable functional form for the effects of priming on issue salience, in
which the parties’ communication strategy influences the salience weights sik, but
voters perfectly observe proposal qualities qik.
Formally, prior to the electoral campaign, each voter has initial issue weights
σik (≥ 0), with
∑
k σ
i
k = 1. At the end of the campaign, these weights become:
sik (tk) = βtk + (1− β)σik. (1)
The salience weight sik is thus a convex combination of the (party-controlled) cam-
paigning times tk, and of the voter’s prior weights σ
i
k. In that convex combination,
β is the relative influence of the electoral campaign and (1− β) that of the initial
weights. The parameter β thus captures priming effectiveness, that is the parties’
capacity to manipulate voters.18 To fix ideas, Bartels (1996) finds that priming can
increase issue salience by 40 to 100%. If a voter’s initial weights are {1/3, 1/3, 1/3},
this yields an estimate of β that lies between 0.2 and 0.5.19
Stage 3: voting. At the beginning of stage 3, voters observe the quality of all
17A relevant question is whether it is the media or the parties who select the information that
the voters will receive. It was shown that the media generally reflect, rather than affect, party
agenda (Brandeburg, 2003; Bartels, 1996). Also, there is evidence that priming effects are maximal
when, in electoral campaigns, both the parties and the media emphasize the same issues.
18One potential microfoundation for such psychological processes could be that voters are im-
perfectly informed and face inspection costs to assess party proposals.
19Solving for µ/3 = β + (1− β) /3, when µ is respectively set to 1.4 and 2.
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party proposals and the communication campaign of the two parties. A voter i
is characterized by the salience weight sik (tk) (≥ 0) she assigns to issue k, with∑
k s
i
k (tk) = 1. To identify which party she will support, voter i compares the
relative merits of each party’s proposal on each issue. She votes for party A iff:
∑
k
sik (tk) q
A
k ≥
∑
k
sik (tk) q
B
k , or∑
k
sik (tk) ∆k ≥ 0, with ∆k ≡ qAk − qBk , (2)
where ∆k is A’s quality advantage on issue k. Importantly, note that within each
issue all voters value quality in the same way.
Party objectives and voter distribution. Each party thus has six control vari-
ables (three quality choices and three campaigning time choices) to maximize its
probability of winning net of investment costs:
ΠP (q, t) = piP (q, t)− CP (q) , (3)
where q ≡{qAa , qAb , qAc , qBa , qBb , qBc } and t ≡{ta, tb, tc}. Party A wins if the pivotal
voter, given her posterior salience weights sk (tk), prefers the manifesto of A to that
of B.20 Given a distribution f of the pivotal voter’s salience weights, this happens
with probability (from now on, we drop the variable tk from sk (tk) for the sake of
20We could use two interpretations that are mathematically equivalent. Either one based on a
winner-takes-it-all system where the distribution of the pivotal voter’s salience weights is under-
stood as random. Alternatively, one may consider a proportional representation system, in which
case we can assume away aggregate uncertainty, and f denotes the overall distribution of salience
weights across the electorate. In the paper, we follow the former interpretation.
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σa=1
σb=1σc=1
Figure 1: Ex-ante distribution of the pivotal voter’s salience weights. The expected
location of the pivotal voter is given by the intersection between all the barycentric
coordinates of the simplex.
readability):
piA (q, t) =
∫
sa
∫
sb
1
[∑
k
sk ∆k ≥ 0
]
f (sa, sb, sc) dsbdsa, s.t. sc = 1−sa−sb. (4)
The indicator function 1 [
∑
k sk ∆k ≥ 0] has value 1 when the pivotal voter prefers
A to B in (2) and 0 otherwise.
We assume a uniform distribution of the pivotal voter’s ex-ante salience weights
over the simplex of admissible preferences:
Sσ ≡
{
(σa, σb, σc) : σk ≥ 0,
∑
k
σk = 1
}
(5)
The density of ex-ante weights within that simplex is therefore: fσ (σa, σb, σc) = 2,
∀ (σa, σb, σc) ∈ Sσ. Figure 1 illustrates this graphically.
However, as explained above, voters are primed by the parties’ communication
campaign (see (1)). From (5), one can derive the set of admissible final salience
13
σa
σb
E[Voter ex-ante]
E[Voter ex-post]
βtb βtb+1−β
βta+1−β
βta
Figure 2: Ex-post distribution of the pivotal voter’s salience weights: the expected
location changes and the simplex shrinks.
weights, Ss (t, β):
Ss (t, β) ≡ {(sa, sb, sc) : βtk ≤ sk ≤ βtk + 1− β, k = a, b, c} ,
which is a smaller triangle within the unit simplex. The size of this triangle is smaller
the larger is β. In other words, a consequence of more effective priming (higher β)
is to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the set of admissible salience weights. This
is illustrated in Figure 2.
At the time of the election, the density of the pivotal voter’s weights has thus
increased to fs (sa, sb, sc) =
2
(1−β)2 , over a smaller set Ss (t, β).
Equilibrium concept. We focus on the subgame perfect equilibria of this game:
at stage 3, voters cast their ballot on the party that maximizes their utility, given
salience weights sik. The winning party is the one preferred by the pivotal voter. At
stage 2, each party chooses the communication strategy that maximizes its proba-
bility of winning given the vector of qualities realized at stage 1. At stage 1, parties
choose the vector of qualities that maximize (3) given expected advertisement strat-
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egy at stage 2 and voting behavior at stage 3.
The Voting Stage
Given the voters’ decision rule (2), we can compute the winning probabilities of
each party at stage 3. These depend on the parties’ proposal qualities. There are
three cases to consider: in case A, party A dominates B in all issues. In case B, B
dominates. In case U, for Undominated, none of the parties dominates in all issues.
Case A. Party A proposes a higher quality on all issues:
∆k ≥ 0,∀k with at least one strict inequality.
In that case, all voters prefer A to B and A’s winning probability is 1 independently
of the parties’ communication strategies. Further increases of proposal quality by
party A cannot further increase A’s winning probability.
Case B. Party A proposes a lower quality on all issues:
∆k ≤ 0,∀k with at least one strict inequality.
In that case, all voters prefer B to A and A’s winning probability is 0. In this case
as well, the communication strategy has no effect.
Case U. None of the parties proposes higher quality on all issues:
min
k
∆k < 0 < max
k
∆k.
In that case, a voter who assigns salience weight 1 to the former issue strictly prefers
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B to A, and conversely for a voter who assigns weight 1 to the latter issue.
Let us focus for the time being on the most intuitive situation, in which A’s
quality advantage is positive and strongest in a, and that of B is positive and
strongest in b: ∆a > 0,∆b < 0,∆c ∈ [∆b,∆a]. By (2) , voter i prefers A to B if,
given her weighting of issues sik, she prefers A’s platform:
∑
k s
i
k ∆k ≥ 0. These are
the voters who value issue a sufficiently more than issue b. Indeed, exploiting the
fact that
∑
k s
i
k = 1, (2) can be re-written as:
sia [∆a −∆c] + sib [∆b −∆c] + ∆c ≥ 0.
The voters who vote for A at stage 3 are therefore:
{
i : sia ≥ sib
∆c −∆b
∆a −∆c −
∆c
∆a −∆c
}
. (6)
In other words, A and B voters are separated by a cutoff line. Importantly, parties
can both influence the position of this cutoff line –by varying their qualities– and the
distribution of the voters’s salience weights –by varying their advertisement times:
1. higher policy quality by party A and lower policy quality by party B always
enlarges the set (6) by moving the cutoff line “down” and “right” in Figure 3.
Yet, policy quality cannot affect the distribution of issue weights.
2. increasing the share of campaigning time dedicated to communicating about
issue a rather than issue b moves the distribution of salience weights “up” and
“left” in Figure 4a. Figures 4b and c illustrate the effects of more commu-
nication time on issues b and c respectively. In contrast with policy quality,
communication cannot affect the position of the cutoff line.
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sa
sb
piA
piB
sc
(a) ∆c increases
sa
sb
piA
piB
sc
(b) ∆b increases
Figure 3: The solid line, depicted for ∆a = −∆b and ∆c = −0.1, determines the
winning probability of party A and B. On panel a, the dashed line describes the
effect of an increase in ∆c. On panel b, the dashed line describes the effect of an
increase in ∆b.
sa
sb
sc
(a) Issue a
sa
sb
sc
(b) Issue b
sa
sb
sc
(c) Issue c
Figure 4: Panel a, b and c shows the change in voters’ salience weights distribu-
tion. The black(gray) point identifies the expected location of the pivotal voter
after(before) the communication stage.
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Combining these two effects, A’s winning probability can be computed as:
piA =
∫ sa=1
sa=sb
∆c−∆b
∆a−∆c−
∆c
∆a−∆c
∫ sb=1
sb=0
fs (sa, sb) dsb dsa, (7)
where fs (sa, sb) =
2
(1−β)2 for all sa ∈ [βta, βta + 1− β] and sb ∈ [βtb, βtb + 1− β] ,
sc = 1− sa − sb, and fs (sa, sb) = 0 otherwise.
Remark 1 If they invest the same (strictly positive) amount in each issue, parties
maintain their initial advantage. On issue a for instance, party A delivers strictly
higher policy quality than B if both invest the same amount in that issue. Conversely,
a party must invest strictly more resources than its competitor to “steal” an issue.
Remark 2 The voters who support party A in (6) would actually turn to supporting
party B if quality differentials were reversed: the zones A and B in Figure 3 would
be swapped. Expressed differently, if salience weights can be interpreted as the voters’
proximity to parties, the base for a party actually depends on the proposals set out
by each party in each issue.
The Communication Stage
At stage 2, investment costs are already sunk. Parties observe qualities and choose
a vector of campaigning times tPk : they “prime” voters. Since investment costs
are already sunk, they exclusively focus on their winning probability (results extend
directly to the case in which parties must allocate an endogenous advertising budget
across issues – see supplementary appendix). Here, we focus on the problem of party
A in Case U defined above: in the other cases, communication does not affect vote
shares. The analysis is symmetric for party B.
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Since tA = tB = 1/2, voters will be exposed to as many arguments from party
A as from party B. Consider the problem of party A: it chooses a vector tA (q) ≡{
tAa , t
A
b , t
A
c
}
to maximize the winning probability given (i) the vector qualities q
resulting from stage 1 and (ii) the communication time constraint,
∑
k t
A
k = 1/2.
That is,
tA (q) = arg max
tA
piA
(
q, tA, tB
)
s.t. tAk ≥ 0 and
∑
k
tAk ≤ 1/2 for k ∈ {a, b, c} .
Remember that the communication strategy is meant to attract the voters’ at-
tention towards specific issue(s) – see (1). It is straightforward to check that each
party maximizes its winning probability by concentrating all its campaigning time
on a single issue, the one in which its quality advantage is maximal:
Proposition 1 Suppose we are in Case U. Then, for any β, each party concentrates
all its campaigning time on the issue in which it has the largest quality advantage.
That is:
(
tAa (q) , t
A
b (q) , t
A
c (q)
)
=

(1/2, 0, 0) if ∆a > ∆c > ∆b or ∆a < ∆c < ∆b
(1/2, 0, 0) if ∆a > ∆b > ∆c or ∆a < ∆b < ∆c
(0, 0, 1/2) if ∆b > ∆a > ∆c or ∆b < ∆a < ∆c
(
tBa (q) , t
B
b (q) , t
B
c (q)
)
=

(0, 1/2, 0) if ∆a > ∆c > ∆b or ∆a < ∆c < ∆b
(0, 0, 1/2) if ∆a > ∆b > ∆c or ∆a < ∆b < ∆c
(0, 1/2, 0) if ∆b > ∆a > ∆c or ∆b < ∆a < ∆c
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And the overall campaign advertisements are:
(ta (q) , tb (q) , tc (q)) =

(1/2, 1/2, 0) if ∆a > ∆c > ∆b or ∆a < ∆c < ∆b
(1/2, 0, 1/2) if ∆a > ∆b > ∆c or ∆a < ∆b < ∆c
(0, 1/2, 1/2) if ∆b > ∆a > ∆c or ∆b < ∆a < ∆c
(8)
where ∆k ≡ qAk − qBk for k ∈ {a, b, c}
To illustrate this result imagine first that both A andB invested the same amount
C¯ in all three issues, which implies that A (respectively B) has higher quality on a
(respectively b): qAa > q
B
a and q
B
b > q
A
b . This also implies that they tie on issue c:
qAc = q
B
c . Expressed in terms of quality differentials, we have: ∆a > 0 = ∆c > ∆b.
From the first line in (8) , party A only wants to communicate on issue a, and party
B only on issue b. None of the parties brings up c, simply because both of them can
attract more votes by emphasizing another issue.
Good illustrations of this case might be the US presidential campaigns of 1992
and 2008: in both campaigns, the Democratic candidate campaigned on domestic
issues (Clinton emphasized his proposals for a new covenant to America and for
reducing the gap between rich and poor; Obama campaigned on his plans for a
better social safety net) whereas both Republican candidates Bush and McCain
campaigned on foreign issues (their higher ability to combat foreign threats).21 In
parallel, a historically relevant campaign issue was muted during these campaigns:
drugs in 1992 and immigration in 2008. In both cases, the reason for muting this
21Note that this campaigning pattern does not depend on the absolute advantage of each can-
didate: imagine that A increases its investment on a in the first stage. Then, emphasizing a in the
second stage has a larger impact on its winning probability. But this does not affect its best re-
sponse: it should still focus the communication campaign on issue a. Coming back to the electoral
campaign of 1992, Bush kept campaigning on his higher ability to fight foreign threats, even when
it was becoming increasingly clear that his success in the Gulf war would be insufficient to win the
election.
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issue is that none of the candidates could build a strong enough quality advantage
on it before the election. Beyond such anecdotal evidence, Damore (2004) shows
that neutral issues typically represent between 0 and 2% of the total campaigning
time.
Conversely, imagine that A invested enough on b to steal this issue from B:
∆b > 0. The ranking of quality differentials is now ∆a > ∆b > ∆c = 0. In
this case, A still communicates on a, since this is its strongest issue, but B’s best
response is modified: it should communicate only about issue c, since it is now its
best option to contain vote losses. This is the second line in (8). One concrete
campaign can illustrate this case: President Clinton had built a strong reputation
on policies such as social security, education and healthcare. Yet, the Republicans
reacted by drafting new proposals to address such issues. In particular, concerning
social security, they proposed to allow people to put a portion of their SS payroll
taxes into personal retirement accounts that would be invested in private stocks and
bonds. This proposal allowed the Republicans to recover dominance in this issue
(According to Gallup polls, only 35% of respondents said Republicans were better
able to handle social security in February 1999. This percentage had increased to
65% at the time of the campaign). In line with Proposition 1, Democrats drastically
reduced their communication on social security: while it was central to their 1996
campaign (Iyengar and Valentino 2000, p116), only 25% of social security ads were
aired by the Democrats during the 2000 campaign (Falk 2001, p23).
Considering each possible (set of) case(s), and discarding the non-generic out-
comes in which ∆ is equal across two or more issues, shows that only the three
communication outcomes of Proposition 1 may emerge. Which is this issue depends
on the parties’ relative qualities, which in turn depend on both the parties’ compar-
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ative advantages and the amount each party has invested in each issue. This result
contrasts with the literature, which assumes that parties cannot control how much
they invest in each issue. In that case, only history and past reputation may define
a party’ strong and weak issues in the current election. In our model instead, policy
quality and issue ownership are endogenous. The equilibrium outcomes in terms of
policy quality are analyzed in the next section.
The Quality Stage
We can now check how parties prepare their manifestos in anticipation of the cam-
paign: we turn to the first stage of the game, in which parties simultaneously select
how much they invest in policy innovations to increase their platform quality.
There are up to three cases to consider: Case A is when ∆k > 0, ∀k. In this
case, A’s winning probability is 1.22 Case B is when ∆k < 0, ∀k, and A’s winning
probability is 0.23 Case U is when none of the parties dominates on all issues, and
their winning probabilities take some value between 0 and 1. We focus on Case U
for the time being, and show that it yields a unique potential equilibrium in pure
strategies. Cases A and B represent possible deviations. They are analyzed in the
next sections, where we also analyze the equilibrium in mixed strategies.
In Case U, there is at least one issue k in which A proposes a strictly better
policy than B (that is: ∆k > 0) and at least one issue k
′ in which B’s proposals
are better than A’s (that is: ∆k′ < 0). We focus for now on the intuitive case in
which A’s quality advantage is positive and highest in a, and that of B is positive
22Since party A wins with probability 1 for any communication strategy, the latter becomes
irrelevant for this part of the analysis. The same holds in Case B.
23Notice that Case A and Case B imply issue stealing, but that issue stealing may occur even
when a party does not dominate on all issues.
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and highest in b: ∆a > 0 > ∆b and ∆a > ∆c > ∆b. We only detail the problem of
party A: the analysis is symmetric for party B.
Party A chooses the vector of policy qualities that maximize its objective function
(3) given the anticipated equilibrium communication strategy of stage 2, tk (q), as
identified in Proposition 1, and the voting behavior (7) that results. That is, it
chooses a vector qA ≡ {qAa , qAb , qAc } such that:
qA = arg max
qAa ,q
A
b ,q
A
c
piA
(
qA,qB; ta (q) , tb (q) , tc (q)
)−∑(qAk )2 /θAk
s.t. qAk ≥ 0 for k ∈ {a, b, c} .
This maximization problem is potentially intricate since the party must take
into account how first-period quality choices influence the second-period allocation
of campaigning times. Yet, the nature of the best responses at the second stage
simplifies this problem: the values tk were shown to be constant within each of the
three cases identified in Proposition 1. We can thus focus on the simpler problem:
qA = arg max
qAa ,q
A
b ,q
A
c
piA
(
qA,qB; t
)−∑(qAk )2 /θAk
s.t. qAk ≥ 0 for k ∈ {a, b, c} ,
in which advertisement times t are independent of q. Once the equilibrium quality
choices from stage 1 are identified, we shall identify which case(s) in (8) can actually
materialize in equilibrium.
As already detailed, A’s probability of winning is the probability that, given her
weighting of the three issues, the pivotal voter values A’s set of proposals more than
B’s:
∑
k sk ∆k ≥ 0, where ∆k denotes the quality differential in issue k, see (7). This
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implies that a marginal increase in quality by party A or by party B have exactly
opposite effects on the parties’ electoral performance. Hence, the two parties face
equal marginal benefits of quality provision.
The difference between the parties only stems from their different marginal costs,
which depend on their reputation advantage. The next proposition shows that, when-
ever a pure strategy equilibrium exists, party A must propose higher-quality policies
than party B in issue a and conversely in issue b:
Proposition 2 In a pure strategy equilibrium we must have that qAa = θq
B
a , q
B
b =
θqAb and q
A
c = q
B
c . Therefore,
∆a = (θ − 1) qBa > ∆c = 0 > (1− θ) qAb = ∆b.
By Proposition 1 this also implies that, in a pure strategy equilibrium, party A
wants to allocate all its campaigning time on issue a and party B on issue b:
t∗ = (ta, tb, tc) = (1/2, 1/2, 0) .
To derive the exact equilibrium quality levels, we must identify the effects of the
communication stage on quality provision. As shown in Figure 2, priming affects
salience weights in two different ways: first, the voters’ attention moves towards
the issues chosen by the parties. Second, voting weights become more homogeneous
across voters. We discuss the impact of each of these effects on quality in the
following section.
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The Homogenization and Attention-Shifting Effects
Since issue c is muted at the communication stage, the salience of that issue is
reduced. In contrast, the salience of the other two issues, a and b, is increased. We
shall see that this effect induces parties to soften competition on the neutral issue,
which increases their rents. We call this phenomenon the attention-shifting effect of
the campaign. This is exactly the parties’ purpose: parties want voters to focus on
their main strengths (a or b) and disregard their weaknesses (c). Thus the attention-
shifting effect induces each party to increase investment on the issue he owns and
decrease investment on the neutral issue.
On the other hand, there is a second, unintended, consequence of the campaign.
We call it the homogenization effect of the campaign. As the campaign evolves, and
because of priming at the second stage, the support of the distribution of the pivotal
voter becomes smaller. As a result, a marginal quality increase in any issue has a
larger impact on the party’s chances of winning the election. This makes competition
tougher in all issues. Thus the homogenization effect induces each party to increase
investment on all issues. Lemma 1 isolates the homogenization effect of quality
provision by considering the out-of-equilibrium campaign in which all issues are
emphasized equally.
Lemma 1 For an exogenously set communication campaign t = {1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
}, all equi-
librium qualities are monotonically increasing in priming effectiveness, β.
Thus, the more parties can prime voters, the stiffer competition becomes, yield-
ing higher-quality proposals in all issues. Yet, in equilibrium, only issues a and b are
emphasized, which triggers the attention-shifting effect. This further increases the
parties’ incentives to provide high-quality proposals in issues a and b, but reduces in-
centives in issue c. Together, the attention-shifting and homogenization effects have
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a clear impact on quality provision for the owned issues a and b, but an ambiguous
impact on quality provision for the neutral issue, c.
How do these two effects eventually shape quality provision in the first stage?
Together, Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 show that the attention-shifting effect dom-
inates the homogenization effect on issue c:
Proposition 3 There is a unique potential pure strategy equilibrium (PSE), in
which quality levels are:
qA,PSEa = q
B,PSE
b = θ
√
1
8 (θ − 1)
1 + β
1− β
qB,PSEa = q
A,PSE
b =
√
1
8 (θ − 1)
1 + β
1− β
qA,PSEc = q
B,PSE
c = θc
√
1
2 (θ − 1)
1− β
1 + β
.
A PSE is thus necessarily symmetric, and such that all quality levels are strictly
positive, unless θc = 0.
Hence, there is a unique and symmetric potential pure strategy equilibrium,
which necessarily yields to Case U. As detailed above, this implies issue special-
ization. On top of this, Proposition 3 also allows us to assess the intensity of the
parties’ ownership of “their” in such an equilibrium. Indeed, the equilibrium quality
differentials turn out to be:
∆a = |∆b| =
√
(θ − 1)
8
1 + β
1− β ,
which are monotonously increasing both in the party’s reputation advantage θ and
in the effectiveness of priming, β. The following corollary identifies other interesting
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comparative statics:
Corollary 1 In a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium:
(i) the attention-shifting effect dominates the homogenization effect in the neutral
issue c (qPc is strictly decreasing in β),
(ii) the more effective is priming, the higher is equilibrium quality both in the strong
and in the weak issue (qPa and q
P
b are strictly increasing in β),
(iii) the better parties are at dealing with issue c, the higher is platform quality in
that issue, without producing an advantage in equilibrium (qPc is increasing in θc but
∆c = 0),
(iv) the parties’ reputational advantage has an ambiguous effect on the parties’ qual-
ity provision in their strong issue, and a negative effect on the other issues.
Let us detail the last effect identified in Corollary 1: from Proposition 3, it
is immediate to see that stronger reputation advantages (higher θ) reduce quality
provision in both a party’s “weak” and “neutral” issues: qA,PSEb and q
A,PSE
c are
strictly decreasing in θ. On the other hand, the effect on a party’s strong issue is
ambiguous. When θ is close to one (comparative advantages are small), competition
is very stiff, since the two parties are almost interchangeable. Slightly increasing
θ, parties invest less in all three issues: competition is softened at the expense of
voters. But when θ becomes sufficiently large (larger than 2 in Figure 5), each party
can actually provide higher quality policies at comparatively low cost. In that case,
quality provision is increasing in θ. The following figure illustrates these effects for
β = 1/3 and θc = 0.5.
Another interesting implication of Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 is that voter
welfare may well be increasing in priming effectiveness. Indeed, welfare is increasing
in platform quality, and we just saw that priming effectiveness drives a quality
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.
increase in issues a and b by both parties. Yet, a complete welfare analysis is beyond
the scope of our analysis: voter payoffs are indeed endogenous to the campaign,
because priming influences salience weights. This makes it impossible to identify
the exact welfare function after the campaign, when priming effects may partially
fade out. Still, there is a case in which the welfare analysis is unambiguous: when
the neutral issue has little importance (θc is small), policy quality is necessarily low
in that issue, and overall qualities must therefore be strictly increasing in priming
effectiveness.
Issue Stealing
The above shows that there is a unique potential pure strategy equilibrium. Yet,
to check whether these strategies are indeed an equilibrium, we must consider two
additional deviations. We focus on party A: first, it may be tempted to steal all
issues from party B and deviate towards Case A. Second, party A may wish to
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deviate by cutting down investment in all issues, and reach Case B. A necessary
condition for the potential equilibrium of Proposition 3 to exist is therefore that it
provides higher payoffs than any of these two deviations.
Lemmas 2 and 3 in the Appendix establish that we only need to consider exactly
one potential deviation towards each case: either party A proposes slightly higher
quality levels than what party B provides in the pure strategy equilibrium, or it
provides 0-qualities for all issues. We denote the quality levels in the first case with
a superscript IS, for Issue Stealing : party A then dominates party B in all issues.
We denote the quality levels in the latter case by the vector qA = 0. The quality
levels in the potential pure strategy equilibrium are denoted qA,PSE and qB,PSE,
and we define qPSE ≡ {qA,PSE,qB,PSE} .
In this section, we focus on the incentive of party A to engage in issue stealing,
and pick qualities qA,IS. The payoff of party A when it plays along the strategy
derived in Proposition 3 is:
ΠP
(
qPSE, t
)
= piA
(
qPSE, t
)−∑
k
(
qP,PSEk
)
θPk
2
=
1
2
− 1 + β
1− β
θ + 1
8 (θ − 1) −
1− β
1 + β
θc
2 (θ − 1) . (9)
Conversely, the payoff of party A when it deviates to qA,IS is:
ΠA
(
qA,IS,qB,PSE
)
= 1−
(
1 + β
1− β
1
8 (θ − 1)
)
1 + θ3
θ
− 1− β
1 + β
θc
2 (θ − 1) . (10)
Note that the probability of election is 1/2 in the former case, and 1 in the latter.
The No issue stealing condition identifies when the former payoff is at least as large
as the latter:
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Proposition 4 (No Issue Stealing Condition – NISC) A necessary condition for the
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is that the parties’ reputation advantage θ be
sufficiently large and/or that priming is sufficiently effective (β large):
θ2 − 1
4θ
≥ 1− β
1 + β
. (11)
Proof. Immediate from (9) and (10) .
When condition (11) is not satisfied, e.g. because parties are insufficiently differ-
entiated (θ is too close to 1), parties start competing “a` la Bertrand” by trying to
steal all issues from their competitor. To represent this graphically, Figure 6 sets
θc = 0, so that q
P
c = 0 in any equilibrium. The point PSE represents the quality
levels for party A in the pure strategy equilibrium, and the point NISC the optimal
quality for party B in the same equilibrium. The latter point also represents the
quality levels that party A must surpass to steal all issues from party B, and thereby
reach the area denoted “piA = 1” at minimum cost: by Lemma 2, locating just to
the right of NISC dominates any other point in that area. The no-issue stealing
condition is satisfied in Figure 6a, because the parties’ reputation advantage is large
(θ = 3) and priming effects are moderate (β = 0.4). Heuristically, the points PSE
and NISC are located sufficiently apart from one another. Deviating from PSE to
NISC is then too costly: the pure strategy equilibrium exists and is the unique
equilibrium. In Figure 6b, the parties’ reputation advantage is small (θ = 1.2; β is
still 0.4). Thus, quality differentials are small in the pure strategy equilibrium, and
issue stealing becomes cheap. In this case, there exists no PSE.
These graphs also shed some light on why the 2000 presidential election cam-
paign in the US appears as an “outlier” in traditional issue ownership theories (see
e.g. Petrocik et al. 2004). In that campaign, candidate G.W. Bush’s single most
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Figure 6: In both panels, we fix θc = 0, so as to collapse one dimension, and β = 0.4.
In panel a, the reputation advantage is high, and deviations from the pure strategy
equilibrium qualities (PSE) are too costly. In panel b, the reputation advantage is
low and parties optimally deviate from PSE strategy.
advertised issue was “education”, despite the Democratic Party’s dominance on the
issue since 1945. The magnitude of the Democratic advantage was very strong in
1996 (in October polls, NBC News and Gallup respectively identify a 23 and 29-point
advantage for the democrats on that issue). By contrast, in 1999, that is prior to the
beginning of the campaign, this advantage had fallen to 12%. This corresponds to
a shift from θ large in 1996 (Figure 6a) to θ small in 2000 (Figure 6b). Republicans
thus had a chance to revert their handicap by engineering a new proposal, which is
what Bush’s No Child Left Behind proposal achieved. According to October 2000
Gallup Polls, 48% of the voters clearly supported Bush’s proposals on education,
against 44% for Gore. Accordingly, Bush campaigned more than Gore on education
(Falk 2001 (p22) shows that Republicans aired 40% more ads mentioning education
than the Democrats).
Whenever the condition (11) is violated, there exists no equilibrium in pure
strategy. Yet, the fact that payoffs are bounded and that payoff discontinuities are
confined to a one-dimensional set of actions ensures equilibrium existence:
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Proposition 5 An equilibrium always exists. Hence, whenever condition (11) is
violated, the equilibrium is in non-degenerate mixed strategies.
Proof. The first stage of our model features continuous payoffs almost everywhere: pay-
offs are continuous for any quality vectors qA 6= qB. Glicksberg (1952) proves equilib-
rium existence when payoffs are continuous. Hence, the question of equilibrium existence
only arises because of discontinuities at the points in which qA = qB. To see this, fix
qˆB =
(
q̂Ba , q̂
B
b , q̂
B
c
)
. For qA = qˆB, we have ΠP = 12 , for P ∈ {A,B} . Yet, for any ε > 0
and any issue k, a deviation towards qAk = q̂
B
k − ε, yields a winning probability of 0 (Case
B). Conversely, a deviation towards qAk = q̂
B
k + ε, yields a winning probability of 1 (Case
A). Dasgupta and Maskin (1986, Theorem 5b) and Simon (1987) show that an equilibrium
necessarily exists in games with such payoff structures.
While fully characterizing this equilibrium in mixed strategies is beyond the
scope of this paper,24 we can easily illustrate its main properties through a simpler,
discrete, version of the model: consider the case of a discrete quality space, in which
party A can only choose one out of three quality levels:
qA ∈ {0,qA,PSE,qA,IS} ,
which are respectively: invest 0 in all issues, at cost 0; invest the quality levels
defined by the pure strategy equilibrium, at a cost which we denote cL for “low”;
and steal all issues from party B, at a cost cH for “high”. We have: cH > cL > 0.
Party B has an equivalent choice set: qB ∈ {0,qB,PSE,qB,IS} . The payoffs of party
24In their model, Kovenock and Roberson (2010) analyze a case in which parties compete on
distinct districts, but effort/quality in one district does not directly influence the probability of
victory in other districts. If we reinterpret their “districts” as “issues”, their equilibrium shows that
issue stealing must arise in their model. The main difference between their model and ours is that
spillovers are present in our setup, making the characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium
intractable.
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A for each combination of effort levels are as follows:
0 qB,PSE qB,IS
0 1/2 0 0
qA,PSE 1− cL 1/2− cL −cL
qA,IS 1− cH 1− cH 1/2− cH
That is, if it provides zero quality, party A wins with probability 1/2 only if
party B also provides zero effort. Otherwise, it loses. If it provides the PSE quality
levels, party A entails cost cL, and wins (a) with probability 1 if party B plays 0,
(b) with probability 1/2 if B provides the PSE qualities, and (c) with probability 0
if party B steals issue a from A. Finally, if A plays qA,IS to steal issue b, it entails
cost cH . It wins with probability 1 if party B either supplies 0 or PSE qualities, and
with probability 1/2 if party B also engages in issue stealing.
In this simplified game, there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium in which(
qA,qB
)
=
(
qA,PSE,qB,PSE
)
if and only if: (1) cL < 1/2 < cH and (2) the following
equivalent to the no issue stealing condition holds:
cL < cH − 1/2 (12)
Instead, when the latter condition is violated, we have:
Proposition 6 In the discrete-choice version of the model, whenever condition (12)
is violated and for 0 < cL < 1/2 < cH < 1,
25 the equilibrium is unique and such
25cH < 1 is a necessary condition for issue stealing to be profitable.
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that:
Pr
(
qA = 0
)
= 1− 2 (cH − cL) = Pr
(
qB = 0
)
Pr
(
qA = qA,PSE
)
= 2cH − 1 = Pr
(
qB = qB,PSE
)
Pr
(
qA = qA,IS
)
= 1− 2cL = Pr
(
qB = qB,IS
)
Hence, whenever condition (12) is violated, the equilibrium is in non-degenerate
mixed strategies and implies issue stealing.
In words, if the cost of issue stealing is not too high –that is, when condition
(12) is violated– there exists no pure strategy equilibrium. If party B were to choose
the PSE quality levels, party A would prefer to engage in issue stealing, at the cost
of higher investment in platform quality. Yet, party B does not want to choose the
PSE quality levels in that case: since it loses for sure, it would gain from cutting
its investment costs and supplying 0-qualities in all issues. Next, if party B sets
0-quality in all issues, party A can still win with probability 1 by cutting down
investment costs and selecting the PSE quality levels. In turn, if party A chooses
qA,PSE with probability 1, party B prefers issue stealing, and so on. The unique
equilibrium is thus in non-degenerate mixed strategies, implying that there is a
strictly positive probability that either party steals all issues from the other.
Extending this logic to a continuous strategy space, whenever condition (11) is
violated, both parties must strictly mix over quality levels, and may end up domi-
nating the other party on any one, two or all issues with strictly positive probability.
Thus, issue stealing (party A offering higher quality than party B on issue b or con-
versely on issue a) happens with strictly positive probability and need not entail
complete dominance by one party.
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The continuous version of the model also has the advantage of showing why and
when condition (11) tends to be violated: the gap between cL and cH depends both
on the parties’ reputation advantages and on priming effectiveness. Strong reputa-
tion advantages reduce the cost cL and increase the cost cH , allowing for the pure
strategy equilibrium to survive. Conversely, the two parties become indistinguish-
able when θ approaches 1. In that case, cL and cH converge towards one another,
which triggers issue stealing.
Yet, we also saw that the cost cL must remain smaller than 1/2 for either the
PSE to exist or the deviation towards issue stealing to be profitable. Another effect
of θ approaching 1 is that both costs increase. As we show in the next section, this
increases the incentive to reduce platform quality.
Effect of Priming on Competition
We just studied the parties’ temptation to deviate towards stealing all issues from
each other. The second deviation to consider is whether party A prefers to stop
investing in its platform, and let party B dominate on all issues. This also leads to
issue stealing, although for the opposite reason: it is party A’s decision to abandon
issue a to party B that allows the latter to dominate.
When party A reduces quality levels to 0 in all issues, it wins with probability
0 at cost 0. Its payoff is thus nil. The temptation to deviate from qA,PSE to 0 is
thus identical to checking the parties’ participation constraint in the PSE. A second
necessary condition for the pure strategy equilibrium to exist is that the payoff in
(9) is positive, or:
Proposition 7 (Participation Constraint – PC) A necessary condition for the pure
strategy equilibrium to exist is that comparative advantages θ be large and priming
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effectiveness β be small: ΠP
(
qPSE, t
) ≥ 0, iff
θ ≥ θ∗ (β, θc) ≡ 5− 3β
3− 5β +
4(1−β)2θc
(1+β)(3−5β) and β < 3/5. (13)
Proposition 7 sheds a new light on the effects of priming on political competition.
It shows that the overall effect of priming can work against the parties’ objective
of securing a safer position. Within the pure strategy equilibrium, higher priming
effectiveness forces both parties to invest more in quality. This is the homogeniza-
tion effect identified above. Party rents thus decrease and, by Proposition 7, the
incentive to deviate from the PSE by pulling out of the race increases. Like in the
previous case, since an equilibrium must exist, it must be in non-degenerate mixed
strategies.26
Importantly, the incentive to pull out does not imply that competition gets soft
in that equilibrium: if a party pulls out, the other party can dominate in all issues
with very low policy qualities. In turn, this implies that the former party now also
has an incentive to increase policy quality above its competitor’s. This induces the
other party to also increase quality, and so on up until the quality levels become so
costly to reach that their participation constraint becomes binding.
Figure 7 illustrates the combined effects of the two conditions (11) and (13)
when θc = 0. The two conditions are represented by the curves NISC and PC
respectively. The PSE exists when comparative advantages are sufficiently large
and priming effects are not too strong. Graphically, this is represented by the white
area above both the NISC and PC curves, where θ is large and β takes intermediate
26From the discrete choice space of the model described above, it is easy to identify how the
mixed strategy equilibrium would be determined: imagine that the costs of supplying the PSE
qualities are so high that it becomes dominated by 0. Then, there must exist two other quality
effort levels strictly between 0 and PSE that satisfy the same conditions as in that simplified
version of the model, and that produce the same mixture, with issue stealing.
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Figure 7: The NISC (No Issue Stealing Condition) and PC (participation constraint)
when θc = 0
values. For such parameter values, parties are sufficiently differentiated (reputation
advantages are large) to render issue stealing too costly, and parties do not need to
invest lots of resources to ensure a 50% probability of winning, which ensures that
their participation constraint is met. Competition is thus relatively soft in this area,
leaving parties with strictly positive rents.
In the bottom left area of the graph, that is when party differences fade away
(i.e. θ → 1) and priming effectiveness is sufficiently small, the temptation to engage
in issue stealing becomes too strong for the pure strategy equilibrium to survive.
As seen above, both parties then adopt a non-degenerate mixed strategy, which
produces issue stealing with strictly positive probability. In the bottom-right area,
the participation constraint is violated: the combination of low party differentiation
and high priming effectiveness would force the two parties to engage in very costly
investments to meet the PSE quality levels. They then also adopt a non-degenerate
mixed strategy, again with the possibility of observing issue stealing.
Finally, the participation constraint shifts up when parties become abler at han-
dling the unbiased issue (i.e. if θc increases). In other words, issue stealing should be
more frequent when issues in which no party has a reputational advantage become
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more relevant in the political debate.
Conclusions
We proposed a model of endogenous issue ownership in which parties can compensate
for a prior reputation disadvantage by investing in policy innovation. This contrasts
with the standard approach on issue ownership: while lesser competence makes it
costly to dominate on an issue, costs need not be prohibitive. Our contribution
is precisely to identify under which circumstances a party chooses to maintain its
reputational advantage and focus on its historically strong issues, or instead try to
steal the opponent’s issues.
We show that two parameters are central to distinguish these two cases: the
magnitude of the initial reputation advantage and the effectiveness of the commu-
nication campaign. In contrast to common intuition, we find that elections become
more competitive when the effectiveness of the communication campaign is higher,
that is when priming has stronger influence on the voters. This is also when the
incentive to engage in issue stealing increases. In other words, the parties’ initial
reputation (dis)advantage over each issue matters less when political advertisement
becomes very effective. This result helps explain why issue ownership may have
become less stable than traditionally perceived. Two additional and empirically
testable results emerge from our analysis. First, the stronger is party reputation
on key issues, the less competitive the election becomes, and the less likely is issue
stealing. Second, stiff competition and issue stealing become more likely when par-
ties face lower investment costs to providing innovative policies on “neutral” issues
(issue c in the model).
The relationships we identify between policy quality and the communication
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campaign also impact on voter welfare. Voter welfare is unambiguously increasing
in policy quality. Yet, we found that more effective political advertisement affects
policy quality differently across issues. For instance, in a pure strategy equilibrium,
higher priming effectiveness leads to higher quality in the issues that are advertised,
and lower quality in the muted issue. Welfare can thus be said to increase in priming
effectiveness if quality is already close to zero for the muted issue. For the other
cases, one must be cautious: the weighting rule that voters use when casting their
ballot is manipulable and can thus not be treated as a welfare function. Similarly,
in a mixed strategy equilibrium, realized qualities can be high or low, and which
issues will be brought up during the campaign remains uncertain ex ante. Future
research is thus needed to fully assess the welfare implications of such equilibrium
behavior.
Note also that our model only focuses on valence issues: in our setup, voters
only compare the relative quality of the two parties’ proposals and vote for the
platform with the highest weighted-average quality. This neglects ideology and
issue divisiveness. We however want to argue that our approach (1) is robust to the
introduction of some ideology in the voters’ decision and (2) usefully complements
the analysis of divisive issues by, e.g. Colomer and Llavador (2011), Glazer and
Lohmann (1989), or Morelli and Van Weelden (2011, 2013).
We indeed could incorporate an ideological position attached to each voter and
party. Introducing ideology would mean that the voters’ tipping points in favor
of one or another party would differ across voters, depending on the ideological
distance between the party and their own bliss point. Thus, a party “dominating”
on an issue would no longer swing all voters at once, but rather a fraction of the
electorate that would be increasing smoothly in the quality advantage. In this way,
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a party’s winning probability would increase steadily in its relative quality, and
decrease in its ideological distance from the “average voter”. On the one hand, this
would make the analysis of mixed strategy equilibria simpler (since there would no
longer be payoff discontinuities). In the spirit of the analyses by Krasa and Polborn
(2010, 2014), it would also make it possible to analyze the question of why and when
parties polarize, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. On the other hand, it
would imply carrying over an additional expected ideological distance parameter
(and its distribution) in all equations and conditions. Thus, while it would make
the model a lot more realistic, this would be at the expense of substantial added
complexity. In order to maintain the analysis simple, we have decided not to pursue
this research line at this stage.
Regarding issue divisiveness, note that the above-referenced analyses do not
study the feedback effects between the advertisement campaign and equilibrium
platform quality. Clearly, a model that combines the intuitions of both approaches
would be richer, but again at the expense of a significant increase in computational
complexity. We also want to argue that divisive and valence issues coexist in electoral
campaigns and target different audiences. Divisive issues are likely to affect more
intensely the vote of partisan voters rather than independent voters. In contrast,
swing voters and centrist voters are more sensitive to arguments about which policies
will bring them a higher return. For instance: how to create more jobs? Which is
the policy most likely to increase my disposable income? Which is the policy that
will provide me with best protection against criminal activities? These swing voters
are the ones we have in mind in our model, and we believe that our model is well
suited to explain the sometimes significant electoral swings that are observed across
elections. As our examples illustrate, many of these swings happened after a party
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acquired a “valence advantage” in some important issue. Interestingly, our model
implicitly predicts that each voter will tend to remain more attached to a party
if issue ownership remains stable across elections. The study of the relationship
between partisanship and issue stealing is however left for future research.
Another potential avenue for future research is to go beyond the symmetric cases
studied in this paper. Allowing for asymmetric comparative advantages for parties
or a multiplication of issues would produce richer results. However, they would still
stem from the same trade-offs as those identified in the symmetric case. Similarly,
relaxing the assumption of a uniform distribution of the voters’ initial issue salience
might make equilibrium results fit additional stylized facts. For example, one could
think that exogenous shocks increase or reduce the salience weight of some issues.
Then, the campaign would again become asymmetric, depending on which party
has a reputation advantage on the “shocked” issue.
Finally, the selection of issues during electoral campaigns also requires further
research concerning the threat of entry by single-issue parties. This would provide
a useful starting point to better analyze proportional elections.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the maximization problem for party A. In the second
stage of the game, party A’s FOCs are given by ∂Π
A
∂tAk
= ∂pi
A
∂tAk
≥ 0 for k ∈ {a, b, c} .
Maximizing the payoff is therefore equivalent to maximizing the probability of winning.
Suppose that ∆a > ∆c > ∆c. In that case, the set of voters who cast their ballot for A
is given by (6). To maximize its probability of winning, A must therefore increase sia (ta)
and reduce sib (tb), which is achieved by focusing all its advertisement campaign on issue
a, i.e. set tAa = 1/2. Conversely, party B should focus all its advertisement campaign on
issue b, i.e. set tBb = 1/2.
If instead ∆b > ∆a > ∆c, then party A’s probability of winning is decreasing in s
i
a (ta)
and increasing in sib (tb). Hence, A must focus all its advertisement campaign on issue
b, i.e. set: tAb = 1/2, whereas party B should focus its campaign on issue a and set
tBa = 1/2. Applying the same reasoning to all possible rankings of ∆a, ∆b, and ∆c yields
the proposition.

Proof of Proposition 2. Remember that the two parties’ payoffs are respectively:
ΠA
(
qA,qB, tA, tB
)
= piA
(
qA,qB, tA, tB
)−∑
k
(
qAk
)2
θAk
,
and:
ΠB
(
qA,qB, tA, tB
)
= 1− piA (qA,qB, tA, tB)−∑
k
(
qBk
)
θBk
2
.
Moreover, θAa = θ
B
b ≡ θ > 1 ≡ θAb = θBa and θAc = θBc ≡ θc. It follows that the parties’
FOCs with respect to qc are:
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dΠA
dqAc
=
∂piA
∂∆c
· ∂∆c
∂qAc
− 2q
A
c
θc
=
∂piA
∂∆c
− 2q
A
c
θc
= 0,
dΠB
dqBc
=
∂piB
∂∆c
· ∂∆c
∂qBc
− 2q
B
c
θBa
= −∂pi
A
∂∆c
(−1)− 2q
B
c
θc
= 0.
Thus, in equilibrium, qA
∗
c = q
B∗
c =
θc
2
∂piA
∂∆c
, which implies ∆c ≡ qAc − qBc = 0.
Similarly, the parties’ FOCs with respect to qa are:
dΠA
dqAa
=
∂piA
∂∆a
· ∂∆a
∂qAa
− 2q
A
a
θ
=
∂piA
∂∆a
− 2q
A
a
θ
= 0,
dΠB
dqBa
=
∂piB
∂∆a
· ∂∆a
∂qBa
− 2qBa = −
∂piA
∂∆a
(−1)− 2qBa = 0.
Thus, in equilibrium, qA
∗
a =
θ
2
∂piA
∂∆a
and qB
∗
a =
1
2
∂piA
∂∆a
, which implies qA
∗
a /q
B∗
a = θ. Recall
that θ > 1. Hence, ∆a ≡ qA∗a − qB
∗
a = (θ − 1) qB
∗
a > 0. Applying similar calculations to
qb obtains q
B∗
b =
1
2
∂piA
∂∆b
and qB
∗
b =
θ
2
∂piA
∂∆b
. Therefore, qB
∗
b /q
A∗
b = θ and ∆b ≡ qA
∗
b − qB
∗
b =
(1− θ) qB∗a < 0.

Lemma A1.
Let:
α ≡ ∆c −∆b
∆a −∆c (> 0) and γ ≡ −
∆c
∆a −∆c (14)
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The parties’ winning probabilities can then be written as:
piA
(
qA, qB, qC ; tA, tB
)
=

1 if γ + αβtb ≤ βta − α (1− β)
1− [α(1−β)+γ+β(αtb−ta)]2
α(1+α)(1−β)2
if βta − α (1− β) ≤ γ + αβtb ≤ βta
[(1−β)−γ+β(αta−tb)]2
(1+α)(1−β)2
if βta ≤ γ + αβtb ≤ βta + 1− β
0 if γ + αβtb ≥ βta + 1− β
(15)
piB
(
qA, qB, qC ; tA, tB
)
= 1− piA (qA, qB, qC ; tA, tB)
Proof. Using (2) and Proposition 2, the pivotal voter will vote for A at stage 3 if her
weighting of issue a, denoted sia, is higher than the value defined by the separating line:
sa (ta) = sb (tb) α+ γ. (16)
In this proof, we focus on the case in which γ + αβtb ≤ βta, which is depicted in Figure
8. We also impose that γ + αβtb is sufficiently large, such that pi
B (·) is strictly positive.
Graphically, these conditions imply that the separating line cuts the simplex “from below”.
B’s winning probability is then the (strictly positive) mass of points with sa (ta) ≤ γ +
αsb (tb). Knowing that, within the simplex Ss (t, β), the density is 2/ (1− β)2 , B’s winning
probability is defined by:
piB
(
qA, qB, qC ; tA, tB
)
=
∫ s1a
βta
K−sa∫
sa−γ
α
2
(1−β)2dsbdsa, (17)
where: K ≡ β (ta + tb) + (1− β) is origin of the downward sloping line sa = K − sb in
Figure 8 and s1a ≡ αK+γ1+α is the value of sa at the point of intersection between that line
and the separating line (16). Remark also that sb ≡ sa−γα is the inverse of the separating
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sa
sb
K
K
γ
βtb βtb+1−β
βta
βta+1−β
γ+αsb=sa
s1a
K−sb
pib
Figure 8: The winning probability of B is given by the black area.
line. This integral represents the surface of the triangle piB in Figure 8, multiplied by
the density of the population within the simplex.
Substituting for K and s1a in (17) and executing the integral yields:
piB (·) = [α(1−β)+γ+β(αtb−ta)]2
α(1+α)(1−β)2 . (18)
The second value of piA (·) in (15) is simply 1−piB (·). The first, third, and fourth cases in
(15) are the values of piA (·) when the separating line respectively (i) passes entirely to the
right of the simplex, (ii) cuts the simplex “from the left” and (iii) passes entirely above
the simplex.
Proof of Lemma 1: To prove the lemma, we use the winning probabilities that result
from Lemma A1 (see above in this appendix) when tk = 1/3, ∀k ∈ {a, b, c}, solve for the
equilibrium quality levels that would result, differentiate them with respect to β.
Focusing on the same case as in Lemma A1, we have:
piB
(
qA, qB, qC ; 13 ,
1
3
)
= [α(1−β)+γ+β(α−1)/3]
2
α(1+α)(1−β)2 (19)
The first order conditions defining the optimal levels of quality are therefore: ∂piP∂α
∂α
∂qPk
+
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∂piP
∂γ
∂γ
∂qPk
=
2qPk
θk
, where ∂piA∂x = −∂piB∂x for x = α, γ. Differentiating (19) yields:
∂piB
∂α
=
(1− 23β)(1−2γ)−(1+2α)
(
β/3−γ
α
)2
(1+α)2(1−β)2 , and
∂piB
∂γ
=
α+γ−β(1+2α)
3
α(1+α)(1−β)2 .
Differentiating α and γ and substituting, we find that in equilibrium, qAb must be equal
to qBa , and hence that α = 1. From Proposition 2, we also have that γ = 0. After some
manipulations, this yields:
qAa /θ = q
B
a =
√
4−(1+β)2
24(1−β)2(θ−1) = q
B
b /θ = q
A
b . (20)
This implies:
∂qAb
∂β
=
(
(1− β)
√
6 (θ − 1)
(
4− (1 + β)2
))−1
> 0.
Next, we have:
qAc =
2θc√
6
√
θ−1
β2−4β+3
(1−β)
√
3−2β−β2
.
Differentiating and simplifying:
∂qAc
∂β
= 8βθc√
6
√
θ−1(3−2β−β2)3/2
> 0

Proof of Proposition 3: To prove the proposition, we use the winning probabilities
that result from Lemma A1 (see above in this appendix) when ta = tb = 1/2, and tc = 0.
Using the same reference case as in the proofs of Lemmas 1 and A1, we have:
piB
(
qA,qB; 12 ,
1
2
)
= [α(1−β)+γ+β(α−1)/2]
2
α(1+α)(1−β)2 . (21)
Note that the only difference between (21) and (19) in the proof of Lemma 1 is that
the last term in the numerator is divided by 2 instead of 3. Derivations are thus similar
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and imply again that α = 1 and γ = 0. In other words, any pure strategy equilibrium
must be symmetric and such that: qAa /θ = q
B
a = q
B
b /θ = q
A
b .
Using the equilibrium values of α and γ to simplify ∂pi
A
∂α and
∂piA
∂γ yields:
∂piA
∂α
=− 1 + β
4 (1− β) (22)
and
∂piA
∂γ
=− 1
1− β . (23)
The proposition follows from substituting these values into the FOCs and finding that the
solution is unique.
Now, we prove two Lemmas that show that we only need to consider one specific
deviation towards Case A or Case B. The first Lemma focuses on Case A:
Lemma 2 Conditional on party A uniformly dominating party B (mink ∆k ≥ 0), party
A maximizes its objective function by setting qAa = q
B
a + εa, q
A
b = q
B
b and q
A
c = q
B
c + εc,
with εa, εc ≥ 0 and εa εc = 0.
Proof. For any
{
qAa , q
A
b , q
A
c
}
such that mink ∆k ≥ 0, the winning probability of party A
is 1. Therefore, party A can only increase its payoff by reducing quality provision, subject
to mink ∆k ≥ 0 and at least one ∆k > 0.
The next lemma establishes that we only need to consider one potential deviation
towards Case B:
Lemma 3 Conditional on party B uniformly dominating party A (maxk ∆k ≤ 0), party
A maximizes its objective function by setting qAa = q
A
b = q
A
c = 0.
Proof. Party A’s winning probability is always 0 in this case B. Cost minimization yields
the result.
Proof of Proposition 5: The first stage of our model features continuous payoffs
almost everywhere: payoffs are continuous for any quality vectors qA 6= qB. Glicksberg
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(1952) proves equilibrium existence when payoffs are continuous. Hence, the question of
equilibrium existence only arises because of discontinuities at the points in which qA = qB.
To see this, fix qˆB =
(
q̂Ba , q̂
B
b , q̂
B
c
)
. For qA = qˆB, we have ΠP = 12 , for P ∈ {A,B} . Yet,
for any ε > 0 and any issue k, if qAk = q̂
B
k − ε whereas the other qualities qAj remain
unchanged, we are in Case B and we have ΠA = 0 . Conversely, if qAk = q̂
B
k + ε whereas
the other qualities qAj remain unchanged, we are in Case A, and we have Π
A = 1 . This
situation is identical to that of an all pay auction, in which auctioneers sink a bidding
cost (here: CP
(
qP
)
) before the auction, and the bidder with the highest bid wins the
auction. Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) prove that an equilibrium must exist in
such games.
Proof of Proposition 7: The participation constraint is violated if ΠA (PSE) < 0.
From (9) , this imposes that:
1
2
− 1 + β
1− β
θ + 1
8 (θ − 1) −
1− β
1 + β
θc
2 (θ − 1) < 0.
After some manipulations, this yields:
θ (3− 5β) < 5− 3β + 4 (1−β)2(1+β) θc. (24)
This inequality always holds for β ≥ 35 . Conversely, for β < 35 , simplifying (24) yields
Proposition 7.
Differentiating the condition with respect to β shows that θ∗ (β, θc) , which is the lowest
level of θ compatible with the PSE, is increasing in β if either β > 1/3 or θc <
(1+β)2
(1−β)(1−3β) .
Under these conditions, issue stealing is more likely the higher is priming effectiveness.
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Supporting information (online supplementary ma-
terial)
This supplementary appendix shows how the modeling assumption that the two parties
have equal campaigning times should actually be seen as a natural outcome when parties
can decide how much budget to spend on advertising.
To this end, consider the following extension of the model: each party chooses how
many ads to buy. The price p of an advert is determined by the law of supply and demand.
It is therefore identical for the two parties, and it is increasing in the total demand for
adverts.
Parties would then maximize the following objective function:
ΠP (q, t) = V P (q, t)− CP − p×
∑
k
tPk . (25)
In this extended setup, total campaigning time is endogenous. In contrast, we normalized
this total time to 1 in the base model. We endogenous campaigning time, we need to
adapt the priming function:
sik = β
tk∑
k tk
+ (1− β)σik.
In this way, β remains the relative influence of the electoral campaign. The necessary first
order condition to maximize (25) with respect to tk is now:
dV P (q, t)
dtk
= p.
That is, the marginal benefit in terms of vote share should be equalized to the marginal
cost of a campaigning advert, p. This marginal benefit depends on how one additional
minute of campaigning time on issue k affects issue weights:
dsik
dtk
= β
1∑
k tk
(1− tk∑
k tk
),
which is decreasing in tk. Thus, the marginal influence of campaigning time is decreasing
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in a party’s campaigning time, and increasing in the other party’s campaigning time.
Factoring in the fact that the two parties have a symmetric impact on issue weights, it is
straightforward to see that the unique equilibrium is for the two parties to equalize their
campaigning times. This is true for any set of quality differentials: if, say party A has
a larger advantage on a than B has on b, the marginal benefit of emphasizing issue a is
large. But then, the benefit of bringing up issue b is large as well. Thus, the only case in
which parties would have a different advertisement strategy is when their funding costs or
their budget constraints are different.
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